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1. Introduction
In this paper, we will study the relationship between infinite dimensional
stochastic differential games (SDG in short) and Isaacs equations on Hubert spaces.
We deal with SDG for systems governed by some special stochastic partial differen-
tial equations (1.1). We define upper and lower semi-discrete approximations and,
using a negative norm, show that their limits satisfy the dynamic programming
principle [Theorems 3.2 and 3.3] and turn out to be unique viscosity solutions of
associated Isaacs equations [Theorem 4.1].
For finite dimensional SDG, Fleming and Souganidis [3] proved that lower
and upper value functions, in Elliott-Kalton sense, are unique viscosity solutions
of associated Isaacs equations. Moreover, limit functions of upper and lower semi-
discrete approximations coincide with upper and lower value functions reapectively.
Since in our SDG the relationship between limit functions and value functions is
still open, our results are partial extensions of [3] into an infinite dimensional one.
Let Wfc, k = 1, 2, be independent 1 dimensional Brownian motions, defined
on a probability space (Ω,F, P), Ft denotes the σ-field generated by {W fc(s),s <
ί, k — 1, 2, •}. Let D be a bounded open domain of Rn with smooth boundary.
We put H = L2(D), \\ \\ = its norm and
Let Y and Z be compact convex subsets of L2(D,RL) and L2(D,RM) respec-
tively. Processes taking vales in Y and Z are called admissible controls of players
I and II respectively, if they are F^-progressively measurable and right continuous
processes with left limits, y (resp. Z) denotes the set of admissible controls of player
I (resp. II).
When players I and II apply admissible controls y(o) and Z(o) respectively,
the system X(o) evolves according to the following stochastic partial differential
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equation on a fixed time interval [0, T],
(1.1) dX(t, x) = (AX(t, x) + b(x, X(t, x), Y(t, x), Z(ί, z)))dί + dM(ί, x)
0 < t < T, x E £>,
with intial condition Jf(0, x) = 77 (x)
and boundary condition X(ί,x) =0, x e bdy(JD)
where a random force M is an £Γ- valued colored noise of the form
with a finite sum ^ mk (= m put) and a smooth orthonormal base {efc, k = 1, 2, •}
of H. Defining β H x Y x Z -^ H by
(1.2) /J(C, 2/, z)(x) = &(*, C (x), ί/(x)^(x)),
we can regard (1.1) as the stochastic differential equation (1.3) on the Hubert space
H [2], [5], [7].
(1.3) dX(t) = (AX(t) + β(X(t),Y(t),Z(t)))dt + dM(t), 0<t<T
X(0) = η.
Let us define the pay-off by
J(ί, ry; q, Y,Z)=E Γ h(X(s), Y(s), Z(s}}ds
where X is a solution of (1.3), (see Definition 2.1).
In our game, player I controls (Yo) and wishes to maximize J(o). On the other
hand, player II controls Z(o) and tries to minimize J(o). L(H) denotes the space of
continuous linear transformations on H with the usual norm (put | |). Defining 5 £
L(H) by 5e/e = m^efc, k — 1, 2, , and introducing semi-discrete approximations,
from above and below,we will show that their limites, V and v, turn out to be
unique viscosity solutions of Isaacs equations (1.4) and (1.5) respectively.
dV(1.4) — (t,η)-(A*dV(t,η),η)-inl r.
at
h(η, y, z)) - -tτaceSd2V(t, η) = 0, 0 < t < T, η € H,
dv(1.5) — (ί,77) - (A*Λ;(t,τ7),f7) - sup in
at
 yeγ
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+ h(η, y, z)) - -traceSd2v(t, η] = 0, 0 < t < T, η G H,
Zl
v(Q) = q.
where d — Frechet derivative, A* = adjoint of A and { , ) = duality pair between
Section 2 is devoted to study of properties of solutions of (1.3). In section
3, we introduce semi-discrete approximation and show the dynamic programming
principle for limit functions. Isaacs equations will be treated in section 4.
2. Preliminaries
Let us assume the following conditions (A1)~(A6),
(Al) aij and r* are in C3(D)
(A2) n x n matrix (a^(x)) is uniformly positive definite, say,
n
a
ij(x)titj > \o\t\2 for t = (ίi, - ,ί
n
) G Rn, with λ0 > 0
(A3) c(o) is in
(A4) inf
xGD c(x) i
(A5) 6; D x R1 x RL x EM -»• R1 is bounded and Lipschitz continuous
(A6) h; H x Y x Z — > R1 is bounded and Lipshitz continuous, say
and | f t(C, j/, z) - Λ(C,2/, 5)| < ^{IIC - C l l + \y - y\ι + z - z\2}
where | i and | \2 are norms in Y and Z respectively. Put Hk = Sobolev space
HQ(D) and || | | f c — its norm. The operator A can be regarded as a linear mapping
Hl — > jFi"1 satisfying the coercive condition,
(2.1) (-Aζ,ζ)>X\\ζ\\l2>0 f o r c e d 1
with a positive constant λ, by (A2) and (A4). Moreover β of (1.2) is bounded and
Lipshitz continuous, by (A5) say
β = *up\\β(ζ,y,z)\\
ζy*
and \ \ β ( ζ , y , z ) - β(ξ,y, z)\\ < μ{\\ζ - ξ\\ + \y - y\ι + \z- z\2}.
Denoting by M2(Q,T-,Hl) the subset of L2([0,Γ] x Ω /ί1) consisting of Ft-
progressively measurable processes, we will define a solution of (1.3).
DEFINITION 2.1. X <E M2(Q,T Hl) is called a solution of (1.3), if X <E
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CQOjTj ίf) a.s. and, for any t and smooth function φ with support in D,
( X ( t ) , φ) = (η, φ)+ ί (AX(s), φ) + ( β ( X ( s ) , Y00, Z(*)), φ)ds + (M (ί), 0), a.s.
./o
Let us show the outline of proof of unique existence of solution, using the usual
successive approximation. Since M(t) is a continuous martingale ([2, Proposition
3.5]), we can get the unique solution X
n
, n = 1,2, , of the following stochastic
differential equation on H, putting Xo(t) = 0,
dX
n
(t) = (AX
n
(i) + β(X
n
-l(t), Y(t),Z(t)))dt + dM(ί), 0 < t < T
X
n
(V) = η (e f f )
with the following evaluation
( T \sup||Xn(ί)||2+ / 11 )^11 )^ <K(||r7||2+^2Γ2 + mΓ)t<τ Jo J
where K is independent of n ([7, Theorem 4 in § 3.1]). On the other hand, (2.1) and
Lipshitz continuity of β derive
Tl
and
CXD a.s.
Γ \\X
n+l(t) - Xn(t)\\?dt < ^ ^ Γ \\Xι(t)\\,Jo n Jo
Therefore we have
vΎ (τ
So, X
n
(t) converges uniformly in t and its limit X(t) turns out to be a solution.
The uniqueness is also proved by the routine.
Proposition 2.1. There is a unique solution X( ;η,Y,Z) of (1.3) having the
following property
( T \Sup||X(ί;77,y,Z)||2+ / \\X(s ,η,Y,Z}\\?d8\t<T Jo )
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where K\ and K2 are independent ofY and Z.
The operator B H-^H2 defined by
d
-i
with boundary value 0
is a compact operator on H. Moreover, A*B is a bounded operator on H and the
following structural condition holds,
(-A*Bφ,φ)>±\\φ\\2-p\φ\B2
with a constant p > 0, where \φ\B
2
 = (Bφ, φ).
Since the dynamics of X(t;η,Y,Z) - X(t',ή,Y,Z) does not depend on the
random noise M(o), we can see the following propositions, employing standard
arguments.
Proposition 2.2 ([6, Theorems 1 and 2]). With probability 1
(2.3) 8up\\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(t;ή,Y,Z)\\<K3\\η-ή\\
t<τ
(2.4) sup\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(t',ή,Y,Z)\l + [ \ \ X ( S ; η , Y , Z ) - X(s;ή,Y,Z)\\2 ds
t<τ Jo
hold, where K$ and K^ are independent ofY, Z and ω e Ω. Moreover the solution
depends on admissible controls continuously.
Proposition 2.3. With probability 1
(2.5)
<K5 Γ Y(s}-Ϋ(s) \ Z(s}-Z(s
Jo l
ds
holds, with a constant K5 independent ofη,t and ω G Ω.
Next we will study the continuity w.r.to time of X(t) = X(t\ η, Y, Z). For fixed
s, we have
d\X(t) -X(s)\B2 = (dX(t),B(X(t)-X(s))) + - \dX(t)\B2
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- X(s), A*B(X(t) - X(s))} + (X(s), A*B(X(t) - X(
, Y(t), Z(t)\ B(X(t) - X(s))} + Σ mi |ς B2 dt
Therefore, the structural condition yields
Proposition 2.4. There are two constants KQ and K7 independent of s, η, Y
and Z, such that
E(\X(t η,Y,Z)-X(s η , Y , Z ) \ B 2 / F s ) < K β ( \ \ X ( s ; η , Y , Z ) \ \ 2
E(\X(t;η,Y,Z)-X(s η,Y,Z)\B2)<K7(\\η\\2 + l)\t-s\.
We need a finer evaluation in the case of s = 0. Let us divide (1.3) into two
parts, (2.6) and (2.7)
(2.6) dξ(t) = Aξ(t)dt + dM(t), ξ(Q) = 0
(2.7) dC(t) - (Aζ(t) + β(X(t),Y(t), Z(ί)))Λ, C(0) = η.
Since X(t) is a known process, both equations have unique solutions. Moreover we
have
C(t) = e t AT7+ / e^-^Aβ(X(s),Y(s},Z(s)}ds.
Jo
Therefore there is a constant K8 independent of η, Y, Z and ω, such that
(2.8) sup ||C(t) - η\\ < sup \\etAη - η\\ -h K
s
βθ.
t<θ t<θ
On the other hand, Ito's formula says
by the condition (2.1). Hence
2m2ί2 + 8 (jί*
Now martingale inequality [4] yields
(2.9) E(sup\\ξ(t)\\*)<K9θ2.
t<θ
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 21
Noting X(t) = ξ(i) + ζ ( t ) , we can easily see
E(sup \\Xfr η, y, Z) - 77||4) < X10(sup ||eίAr? - η\\* + 02)
ί<0 t<6>
with KIO independent of y and Z. Setting τ(r/,d) = exit time from the ball,
{ζeH]\\ζ-η\\< d}, and fixing small 0 - 0(ry, d) such that
θ < d/(3βK8) and sup \\etAη - η\\ < ^
t<0 3
we get, by (2.8) and (2.9)
P(τfa, d)<s)= P(sup ||X(ί; 77, y, Z) - η\\ > d)
t<s
< P (
\
sup ||ί(t)|| > < 4K9s2/d4 for s < θ.
t<s
Proposition 2.5.
P(τ(η, d)<s)< K
n
s
2/d* for 5 < θ(η, d)
with a constant K\\ independent ofη, d, Y and Z.
3. Semi-discrete approximation
According to [3], we will define a semi-descretization of game with equi-
partition of [0,T]. An admissible control Y for player I is called Δ-step, if Y(t) = y
for t G [0, Δ) with y G Y and Y(s) = Y(kΔ) for 5 G [fcΔ, (fc + l)Δ). For Δ = 2~NT,
the set of Δ-step admissible controls for player I is denoted by y/v The Δ-step
admissible control for player II is defined in a similar way and their collection is
denoted by ZN. Hereafter we put Δ = 2~
N
Ί.
DEFINITION 3.1.
(i) Δ-step strategy for player I is a mpping α : Z — » y/v such that
(1) α(Z)(ί),ί G [0, Δ), does not depend on Z and t.
(2) if P(Z(s) = Z(s)) = I for 5 G [0, fcΔ), then α(Z)(fcΔ) = α(Z)(fcΔ), a.s.
for fc= 1 , 2 , - - - , 2 N .
(ii) α; Z -+ y is called an elementary strategy (e-strategy in short) of player I, if
(1) α is non-anticipative, namely "P(Z(s) = Z(s)) = 1 for s < ί" implies
(2) for any ε > 0, there is an approximate step strategy a
ε
 such that
(3.1) sup sup E\a(Z)(s) - a
ε
(Z)(s)\l2 < ε.
s<τ zez
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For player II, Δ-step straregy 7; y — » ZN and e-strategy 7; y — » Z are defined
in a similar way. AN and A (resp. 7£τv and It) denote the sets of Δ-step strategies
and e-strategies of player I (resp. II) respectively.
Proposition 3.1 (See Proof of (2.3) in [3]). For any a e A and 7 e ΊIN, there
exist Ϋ <^y and Z G ZN such that
a(Z)(t) = Ϋ(t) and ~f(Y)(t) = Z(t) on [0,T].
Let us set
Q = {<?; H — » R1, bounded and Lίpschίtz continuous w. r. to \ |#,
say q = sup \q(η)\ and \q(η) - q(ή)\ < Lq\η - ή\B}.
Ή
For a given q G Q, the pay-off J satisfies
(3.2)
(3.3)
\J(t,η',q,Y,Z}-J(t,η q,Ϋ,Z)\
< c3(l + Lq)[E ί\\Y(s} - Ϋ(s)\l2 + \Z(s) -Jo
where cif i = 1, 2, 3, are independent oft, η \ q,Y and Z, by (2.3)~(2.5).
Putting J(ί, η g,y, 7) = J(t,τy;qf,y, 7y) and J(t,η-,q,a,Z) = J(t,η;q,aZ, Z)
for simplicity, we define semi-discrete approximations, V/v and υjv, by
VN (t, η', q) = inf sup J(ί , r/; ςf , y, 7)
7E7£jv yey
vN(t,η;q}= sup inf J(ί,τy;ςf,α,Z).
From the definitions, we can easily see that VN (resp. ^w) is decreasing (resp.
increasing), as TV — > oo, and
lim VN(t, η; q) = inf sup J(ί, ry; 9, y, 7) (= V^ί, 77; ςf) say)N-+OC
lim
 Vjv(t, r/; ςf) = sup inf J(ί, r/; ςf, α, Z) (= υ(ί, 77; ςf) say)TV^oo
 a
^^ZeZ
Moreover, we have, by (3.2) and (3.3), for N = 1, 2, ,
(3.4) \VN(t,η',q)-VN(t,ή',q)\<cl(l + Lq)\η-ή\B
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 23
\V(t,η;q)-V(t,ή;q)\<Cι(l + Lq)\η-ή\B
(3.5) \VN(t,η;q) - VN(s,η; q)\ < C2(\\η\\ + 1 + Lq)y/
\V(t, η; q) - V(a, η;q)\< c2(\\η\\ + 1 + Lq)^/\
Hereafter we will consider VN and V, because VN and v are treated by similar
methods. Putting
, 77; q
r
z) = sup J(Δ, 77; q, Y, z] for z G Z,
we define 5 = SN] Q -> Q by
(3.6) Sq(η)= m
ze
Then we have the following proposition, which is useful for the proof of dynamic
programming principle.
Proposition 3.2. For any k and a positive ε, there exist a E A and 7 G KN
such that
(3.7) J(fcΔ, 77; g, y, 7) - ε < SNkq(η) < J(fcΔ, 77; <?, α, Z} + ε
for any Y G 3^  and Z G ZN-
Proof. We will apply similar arguments as [3]. For c > 0, we take a positive
δ = (5(c, q) such that
(3.8) |J(Δ,77;ς,y,Z)-J(Δ,rjf;ςr,y,Z)| < c, whenever \η - ή\B <δ
and
I J(Δ,77; g, y, z) — J(Δ,77;g, y, z)| < c, whenever |z — 5|2 < δ
Dividing H = UjΞΊ ^j anc^ ^ = U^=ι ^  with | |B — diam. (Aj) < δ and
diam. (Cι) < δ, we fix 77^ - G Aj and zt G Q arbitrarily. Since there is z* = z*(η\q)
such that
, 77; 0,3*) <Sq(η) + c
putting z*j = z*(ηj ,q), we can see, from (3.8)
(3.9) J(Δ,η;q,Y,z*j)<ψ(Δ,η',q,z*j)<Sq(η) + 3c for η G Aj.
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Since Y is compact and convex, we can take a step admissible control Yji = Yjt(q),
say Yji G y
m
 with TV < ra, such that
- c.
Therefore (3.8) again yields
(3.10) J(Δ,r7;<?,y^,z) > ^(Δ^ g, z) - 5c for η G A , and z €
Putting ^ = S*ςf, z*ji = z * ( η j , q i ) and Y^ = Yji(qi), we define 7 G T^TV and
α G .4 as follows,
%
 fc-ι/Λ,(r7) for * < Δ,
where /^ = indicator of A, namely 7(y)(s) = z*j^-ι for 77 G A^ , s < Δ. Using the
unique solution X(s) = X(s;η,Y,j) on [0, Δ], we define *γ(Y) on [Δ,2Δ) by
for se[Δ,2Δ).
Since we have a unique solution X(s) — X(s\ η, Y, 7) on [0, 2Δ], repeating the same
procedure, we get the following 7 G UN on [0, fcΔ).
fc-1
, for 77
Next, putting w%(t) = w(t + θ) - w(θ) and ΫJH(W)(S) = Yj^k-ι-i(w^A)(s - iΔ) for
s G [iΔ, (z + 1)Δ) and using the same procedure as 7, we define a by (3.11),
(3.11) α
fc-l oo L
for η G Ap.
We shall prove that a G Λ. For a small 6 = 2~PT, p > TV, we can take a large
m = m(r/, δ), by (2.2), such that
P(X(iΔ η,a,Z}}φF)<δ for z - 1, 2, - - - ,y G y, Z G Z,
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where F = Uj=ι Ar Fixing y £ Y arbitrarily, we define an approximate <5-step
strategy ά by
ά(Z}(s) = IlQtδ)(s)y
ί=ι
k-l m L
j (X(iA; η, a, Z))ICί (Z(ίΔ)),
Then we get
yIFc(X(iΔ;η,a,Z)) \ .
- α(Z)(s)|ι < l)diam.y.
This concludes a £ A.
We will now prove the inequality (3.7).
(3.12) Skq(η)-J(kΔ,η;q,Y,>γ)
k-l
i=0
Using jY G ZN and (3.9), we have
, 77; gfc-i-i, y, 7)-
(3.13) , 77; <&_;_!, F, 7)
<E
,-iΔ
/ Λ(-X"
Jo
Hence (3. 12) and (3.13) yield
Skq(η)-J(kΔ,η;q,Y,>γ)>-δkc.
For the right inequality of (3.7), we can see, from (3.6), (3.10) and (3.11)
(3.14) 7((i + l)Δ,i7;ς f c_i-ι,α,Z)> J(tΔ,77;ς f c_i,α,Z)-5c.
Inserting (3.14) into (3.12), we have
5*5(77) - J(fcΔ, r?; q, a, Z) < 5kc.
Replacing c with ε/5k, we complete the proof of Proposition. D
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Now we get
(3.15) inf sτLpJ(kΔ,η;q,Y,<γ)<Skq(η)
< sup inf J(kΔ,η\q,a,Z).
Proposition 3.1 however derives, for any α E A and 7 E
inf J(ί, 77; ς, α, Z) < J(ί, 77; g, α, Z)
= J(ί, 77; g, y , 7) < sup J(ί, 77; ςf, y, 7)
with some y G 3^  and Z € ^τv Therefore, for any <? G Q,
(3.16) sup inf J(ί, ry; g, α, Z) < inf sup J(ί, 77; g, Y, 7)
holds. Consequently, both inequalities of (3.15) turn out to be equalities. We have
that means
Theorem 3.1 (Discrete dynamic programming principle for VΛ/ )
= inf sup
/./cΔ
/ h(X(
Jo
), y 00,
 Ί
Y(s))ds + VivϋΔ, X(feΔ); q)
where X(i) = X(t η, Y,
Proposition 3.3. As N -> oo, VN( ]q) is decreasing to V( q) uniformly on
any bounded set of [0, T] x H.
Proof. For 7 E 7£ and ε > 0, we can take a step strategy 7 (E Ί^N say) such
sup sup |J(ί,r?;g,y,7) - J(ί, 7759,^7) I <
that
by (2.6) and (3.1). Hence we have
sup J(ί, 77; ςr, y, 7) > sup J(ί, 77; ς, y, 7) - ε > VN(t,η;q] - ε.
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Therefore, for any t and 77, we can take e-strategy 7* = 7*(ί, 77) and TV* = N*(t,η)
such that
V(t, 77; q) > sup J(ί, 77; 9, y, 7*) - ε > VN(t, 77; ?) - 2ε
whenever N > N*. Moreover, for a bounded set Λ of [0, T] x H, there is a finite set
{(ti,ηj),ij = l,2, ,ra} such that, for any (ί,ry) G Λ
min \VN(t,η',q)-VN(ti,ηj',q)\ <ε N = 1,2, -
m n
by virtue of (3.4) and (3.5). Hence, putting M = max{7V*(^7?j), ΐ, j = 1, , m}, we
get
(3.17) y(t,r7;g)>yM(t,r7;g)-4ε for ( t , r y ) 6 A .
Since V^(ί, 77; g) is decreasing to V(t, 77; ς), (3.17) completes the proof of Proposition.
We are now ready to state the dynamic programming principle. D
Theorem 3.2.
Γ /•*
V(t + 5, 77; g) = inf supE\ h(X(θ), Y(θ).
Ί
Y(θ))dθ + ^ (
where X(t) = X(t; 77, y,
(3.18) V(ί -f β, 77; ςf) - V(t, 77; y(
β
, 77;
Proof. First of all, we show (£, 5)-continuity of the right hand side of (3.18).
Recalling (3.5), we have
< sup sup E\V(s,X(t) q) - V ( s , X ( t ) ; q ) \ < c4(l + Lq7eπye^
and
Hence it is enough to prove (3.18) for dense points t and s, say £ = /c2~p and
s = j2~p. Theorem 3.1 yields
(3.19) VN(t + s,η;q) = VN(t,η',VN(s,η ,q)) for N < p.
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Moreover Proposition 3.3 says that, for ε > 0, there is a large N0 such that
\VN(s,η',q)-V(s,η;q)\<ε for | |τ? | | < -
whenever N > N0. Therefore
E\VN(s, X(t; 77, y, Z); q) - V(s, X(ί; 77, y, Z); ς)|
l + \\η\\2) for TV > 7V0.
So we get
(3.20) \VN(t, 77; VW(s, o; q)) - VN(t, 77; F(s, o; g))|
<ε + 2ε2(/ιT + ς)K2(l + ||77||2) for N > N0.
Since V;v(i,r/; V(s, o ς)) is decreasing to 1^(^,77; y(s,o^)), (3.19) and (3.20)
complete the proof of Theorem. D
Employing similar arguments, we can prove
Theorem 3.3. v( g) satisfies the dynamic programming principle,
v(t + 5, 77; q) = sup inf E \ ί h(X(θ), aZ(θ), Z(θ))dθ + v(s, X(t); q) .
aeΛ
z
^
z
 [Jo J
We can easily see, from (3.16), the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. v(t,η;q) < V(t,η-,q).
4. Viscosity solutions
We shall define a viscosity solution of the nonlinear equation (4.1) below,
according to Crandall and Lions [1], [8].
φ G C12((0,T) x H) is called a test function, if (i) φ is weakly lower semi-
continuous and bounded from below and (ii) dφ(t,η) G H2 and both of dφ and
A*dφ are continuous, g e C2(H) is called radial, ifg(η) = g(\\η\\) with g G C2[0, oo)
increasing from 0 to oo.
Let us consider the following equation
(4.1) 0 = ^ (ί, 77) - (A*dV(t, 77), 77} + F(ί, 77, V(t, 77), dV(t, η),d2V(t, 77))
for te(0,Γ), 77 e f f ,
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where F\ [0, T] x H x R1 x H x L(H) — > R1 is uniformly continuous on any bounded
set.
DEFINITION 4.1. V G C([0, T] xf/") is called a subsolution (resp. super solution)
of (4.1), if 1^(0,77) = Φ(τ7) and the following condition (i) (resp. (ii)) holds for any
test function φ and radial function g,
(i) I f V — φ — g has a local maximum at (£, 77) e (0, Γ) x # , then
(ί, 77) - (A*a0(ί, r)), 77} + F(ί, r), y(t, r}),
σr
(ii) If V + φ + g has a local minimum at (t, ή) e (0, T) x if, then
-?(t,ή) + (A*dφ(t,ή),η)
V is called a viscosity solution, if it is both a subsolution and a super solution.
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. V( ;<?) is the unique viscosity solution of Isaacs equation (1.4),
in the set of bounded and weakly continuous functions.
Proof. Suppose that V-φ-g has a local maximum at (t, 77) G (0,T) x H, say
(4.2) V(t,ή)-φ(t,ή)-g(ή)>V(t,η)-φ(t,η)-g(η) for (t, 77) G Λ
where Λ = {(£,77); |ί-ί| < <5* and | |r7-ry| | < ^*}. Moreover, for ε > 0, there is δ > 0,
such that
\fι(t,η)-fι(t,η)\<έ for fr=φ^g
| |/2(ί,r7)-/2(ί,r7)| |<f for f2 = dφ,A*dφ,dg
\h(t,η)-h(t,ή)\<έ for f3 = 02φ,d2g,
whenever |ί — ί| < ί and ||τ7 — 7}|| < δ.
First of all, we evaluate E[V(t - θ,X(θ)\q) - V(i,ή)\q)\, where X(θ) =
X(θ;ή,Y,ΊY). Let us set δ = min(<S*,<5) and r = exit time from the closed ball
with center ή and radius δ. Applying (4.2) and Ito's formula, we get, for θ < δ,
(4.3) E(V(t - θ, X(0); q) - V(t, ry; ς); r > θ)
< E(φ(t - θ, X(θ)) - φ(t, η) + g(X(θ}) - g(η); τ > θ)
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<E
(dg(X(s}},AX(s}}
(d(φ .
(A*dφ(t-8,X(8),X(8))
], y (
β
),
 7y (*
4- -tτaceSΘ2(φ + g}(t - s, X ( s ) ) ) d s ] τ>θ
+ E \ (d(φ + g)(i - s, XOO), dM (5)); r >
LJO
where X(θ) = X(θ\ ή, Y, ^Y). Denoting the last term by I, we have
/
τΛ0
(d(φ + g)(t-8,X(8)),dM(s))
.
-E
= h~ /2
/
τ
.
g)(i-s,X(s)),dM(S)) τ<θ
(72)2 < mE
fTfίθL j
for a small θ. Hence
for
where /ci is independent of y and 7. Hereafter ki stands for a constant independent
of y and 7. Since (2.1) yields (dg(ζ),Aζ) < 0,
(4.4) E(V(t - θ, X(θ)\ q) - V(t, ή;q);τ>θ)
" *
 +
holds. Again Proposition 2.5 says
(4.5) E(V(t - 0, X(θ) q) - V(t, i
Combining (4.4) with (4.5), we get
(4.6) J(Y,
Ί
)=E
,θ
/
Jo
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θ
E r\
Jo
+ k5εθ + kβVfP/δ2, for small (9.
Let us put
F(y, z) = (d(φ + 0)(f , r)), /3(r), y, 2)} + Λ(τ), y, z).
Since a constant strategy, 7^(5) = 2: for any Y and 5, is in K, we see
(4.7) inf sup£ / F(Y(s),ΊY(s))ds
Ί£Kγ
e
y J0
rθ
< inf supE / F(Y(s),z)ds
z
^
z
vey Jo
ί
θ
< inf sup E I supF(y,z)ds < inf sup F(y, z)θ.
z£Zγ
e
y JQ
 y^γ z£Zyeγ
For any ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that
, z) — F ( y , z ) \ < ε, whenever \y — y\ι < δ and \z — z\2 < δ.
Dividing Y = (J Y{ and Z = [J Zp with diam.Yi <
i=l p=l
and diam.Z < 6
respectively and fixing yι G YI and 2:p G ^p arbitrarily, we define G; Z — > y by
^^ = y^(p) for z € Zp,
where l(p) = mm.{fc;maxi=ι j... jjF(yi,Zp) = F(yfc,£P)} Then, for any z G Zp
(4.8) F(Gz, z} > F(y
έ(p),zp) - ε > .max . F(yi, z) - 2ε
Fixing a step strategy 7 arbitrarily, say 7 G 7£τv we define Y G FTV and Z G ZAΓ
as follows. Noting ΊY(s), s G [0,Δ) is independent of Y and 5 for 7 G nN, we
put Z(s) - -γY(s) and y(s) = GZ(ϋ) for 5 G [0,Δ). For s G [Δ,2Δ), we put
Z(s) = 7F(Δ) and Ϋ(s) = GZ(Δ). Repeating this argument, we get Z G ZN and
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Ϋ e yN such that Z = ^Ϋ and Ϋ = GZ. Therefore, for 5 e [fcΔ, (k + 1)Δ),
F(Ϋ(s),*γΫ(s)) =
> sup F(ι/, 7F(fcΔ)) - 3ε > inf sup F(y, z) - 3ε
holds, by (4.8). Hence for any step strategy 7,
rθ rθ
supE F(Y(s)^Y(s))ds>E
Yey Jo Jo
> (inf supF(y,z) - 3ε)θ
holds. Since step strategies are dense in 7£, we have
inf sup E I F(Y(s)^Y(s)}ds > ( inf sup F(y, z] - 3ε)θ.
z£Z
 yeγ
Since ε is arbitrary, we get, recalling (4.7),
Γ
θ
(4.9) inf sup E I F(Y(s),
Ί
Y(s))ds = inf sup F(y, z)θ.
Ί£Kγ
e
y J0 z£Z y£Y
Inserting (4.6) and (4.9) into (4.3) and dividing by 0, we obtain, as θ — » 0,
O / -I
0 < —jjjM + (A*dφ(ϊ,ή),η) + -traceSd2 (</>
+ inf sup((a(0 + g ) ( t , ή),β(ή, y, z)) + h(ή, y, z))
Since ε is arbitrary, V turns out to be a subsolution of (1.4).
Employing similar arguments, we can prove that V is a super solution. Hence V
is a viscosity solution. Now the uniqueness theorem [8] completes the proof, since
V is bounded and weakly continuous. D
In the same way, we can see the following theorem,
Theorem 4.2. υ( \q) is the unique viscoity solution of Isaacs equation (1.5) in
the set of bounded and weakly countinuous functions.
Hence we have
Corollary. V( q) — v( q) holds, under the following Isaacs' condition',
sup inf (ξ,β(η,y,z)) = inf 8up(ξ,β(η, y, z)), for any ξ e H.
y(Ξγ zez
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